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ABSTRACT 
GDP-linked bonds could play an important role in helping countries to avoid 
solvency crises, defaults and sovereign debt restructurings. Indexing a country’s debt 
payments to its economic performance could give governments some type of 
insurance against periods of declining growth rates.  
 
In this context, this thesis illustrates the potential advantages of the issuance of such 
an instrument, namely by quantifying the above mentioned insurance effect. As such, 
the interest savings for a group of countries most affected by the European sovereign 
debt crisis should they have issued GDP-linked bonds in the beginning of the decade 
are calculated. It is concluded that theses savings would have been considerable.  
 
Furthermore, in order to understand the additional room for countercyclical fiscal 
measures created by this product, the correlation between primary balance and GDP 
growth is simulated for both scenarios: debt with indexation to GDP growth and 
without it. It is then concluded that correlation between those two variables would be 
significantly higher with indexation.  
 
In the same vein, it is also simulated the issuance of this instrument in currency 
unions, in particular in the euro area, applying the corresponding fiscal constraint to 
the total deficit of 3% of GDP. Thus, the correlation between primary balance and 
GDP growth shows that indexing debt to GDP growth has the potential to offset the 
curbing effect of the mentioned constraint.  
 
Moreover, through simple regressions and using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, it 
is concluded that the portion of undiversified risk associated to the indexation to 
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Debt restructurings - which recently also occurred in advanced economies - and its 
effects have long been a concern for sovereign bonds investors and researchers, 
having witnessed a peak of interest during the recent global financial crisis. As such, 
most of the restructurings so far took place after default and are usually described as 
having harmful consequences on the domestic economy and the financial sector 
(Trebesch et al. 2012), and those that include higher haircuts can translate into higher 
bond yield spreads and extended periods of capital markets exclusion (Cruces & 
Trebesch 2013). 
 
In this context, and given the specific features of restructurings with sovereign 
involvement versus private sector, new forms of debt instruments have been 
suggested in order to make them more efficient. In particular, against a background 
of countries with high levels of debt, coupled with low levels of growth and inflation, 
GDP-linked bonds have been recently in the spotlight. The G-20, in the G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting of 24 July 2016, recognized that 
fiscal policy and fiscal strategies are essential in supporting growth. As such, G-20 
members, in that meeting’s communiqué, called for “further analysis of the 
technicalities, opportunities, and challenges of state-contingent debt instruments, 
including GDP-linked bonds (…)” (G20 2016). 
 
The particular characteristic of a GDP-linked bond is the indexation of its coupon 
rate (or even its principal) to the issuer country’s GDP growth rate so that the 
security’s cash flow payments would reflect and adjust to the GDP evolution. This 
debt instrument could play an important role in helping to avoid solvency crises by, 
inter alia, increasing countries’ fiscal space and allowing for countercyclical fiscal 
policies, providing countries with a form of insurance against downturns. It would, 
therefore, reduce the probability of defaults, debt restructurings and their associated 
costs. Researchers have been exploring GDP-indexed bonds since the 1990s and 
instruments with growth performance indexation features have already been issued 
(for instances by Costa Rica, Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Singapore, and more 
recently by Argentina and Greece and Ukraine). However, this type of issuance is 
still considered an exception and has not accomplished its full potential as an 
instrument that could play an important role in helping countries to avoid solvency 
crises and by better sharing risk with private creditors.    
 
As such, first, this thesis depicts the main characteristics of a GDP-indexed bond 
(section 1.1) and, in order to quantify its insurance effect and to understand other 
potential fiscal benefits, a set of scenarios are presented, revisiting some of the 
exercises laid out by Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004). In section 
1.2.1 the savings or expenses are calculated, between 2000 and 2013, for a group of 
countries (Portugal, Spain and Ireland) should they have issued GDP-indexed bonds. 
By adjusting the implicit observed coupon rate to growth performance, a new rate is 
calculated and the difference between the corresponding interest amounts is 
computed so that the mentioned savings or expenses could be determined.   
 
In section 1.2.2, also simulating that a group of countries had issued this growth-
indexed instrument, it is illustrated how much additional room countries would have 
had to pursue countercyclical fiscal policies. This is achieved by calculating, for the 
period between 2000 and 2013, the correlation between primary balance and growth 
rate in two scenarios: with plain vanilla bonds and introducing GDP-linked bonds. In 
the latter case, an “adjusted primary balance” is computed considering the new 
interest amounts stemming from the introduction of the new instrument. In section 
1.2.3 that same additional room is simulated, for the same period, in the case of a 
fiscal deficit limit of 3% of GDP.   
 
In section 1.3, we estimate the possible impact of the indexation of the coupon rate to 
GDP growth on the interest rate, in particular on how much above the risk-free rate 
would investors ask for holding this kind of growth performance instrument. As 
such, a set of regressions (for the period 1980-2015) of individual countries’ GDP 
growth rates on the world real GDP rates was estimated in order to assess the 
associated undiversified risk. 
 
Finally, in section 2, previous issuances of GDP-linked instruments are analysed 
(section 2.1) and, in section 2.2, barriers to the implementation of such a product and 
possible solutions to overcome them are discussed. 
  
2. Literature Review 
 
The international debt crisis in the 1980s led countries to fail their legal obligation to 
meet debt repayments in many countries worldwide, in particular in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. Ever since then, both experts and researchers have been 
interested in finding instruments that improve risk-sharing arrangements between 
governments and investors, allowing for a reduction of sovereign defaults and their 
corresponding costs. In this context, proposals of innovative financial products began 
to emerge, including the suggestion of indexing debt repayments to macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, exports or commodity prices. As an example, Krugman 
(Krugman 1988), in an attempt to solve the trade-off between debt forgiveness and 
financing, suggested that linking payments to measures of economic conditions could 
benefit both debtors and creditors.  
 
Nevertheless, to understand better the importance of these types of instruments, it is 
crucial to describe the broader context in which they assume relevance.  In this vein, 
the usual length and complexity of sovereign debt restructurings must be highlighted. 
As described by Trebesch et al., these processes are triggered by a default episode in 
contracted debt payments or by a debt-restructuring announcement (Trebesch et al. 
2012). This is often when Governments start negotiation procedures with creditors, 
in order to agree on the terms of a debt exchange, which will provide debtors with 
debt relief. These processes can take several years.   
 
Adding to the above-mentioned procedural complexity, there are specificities for 
sovereign debt restructurings, as opposed to for private sector processes, making 
them more difficult to achieve. Brooke and Mendes list the following characteristics: 
i) limits on the available legal means to enforce payments, namely the inability to 
liquidate the sovereign’s assets; ii) constraints on the ability of a sovereign to pledge 
collateral credibly; iii) the large size of individual stocks of sovereign debt which 
makes it difficult to hedge its default risk effectively; and iv) the importance of 
sovereign debt in financial markets (Brooke & Mendes 2013). Bedford et al. also 
stress the current poor coordination between creditors and sovereigns in debt 
restructurings and information asymmetries (Bedford et al. 2005). 
 
In this context and given the frequency of financial crises, particularly in emerging 
economies, several authors have suggested ways to reduce inefficiencies of debt 
restructurings and their consequential costs. Borensztein and Panizza investigate the 
empirical basis of the costs of sovereign defaults (Borensztein & Panizza 2009), and 
Eichengreen discusses different approaches to this problem, presenting three main 
possible reforms: i) maintaining the status quo, promoting the development of more 
complete and efficient debt agreements - a "contractual approach", falling under the 
currently used collective action clauses (CAC); ii) a "legislative approach" that 
would provide some of the functions of an international mechanism of insolvency; 
and finally iii) the establishment of a full-fledged international bankruptcy court 
(Eichengreen 2003). 
 
With regard to the “legislative approach” (reform ii), Anne Krueger, former First 
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, proposed in 2002 the creation of a sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism, equitable across all the sovereigns’ creditors, allowing 
for an orderly, timely and predictable restructuring process of considered 
unsustainable debt . Along the same lines, more recently, (Gianviti et al. 2010) 
proposed in 2010 the creation of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism .   
Nevertheless, the IMF, recognising and supporting the need for reforms in order to 
achieve more orderly sovereign debt restructurings, seems to follow the “contractual 
approach”, by reforming bond contracts (reform i). 
 
Finally, Eichengreen suggested that those with reservations about these two 
approaches would want alternatives, such as new forms of debt (Eichengreen 2003). 
And, as a reference, quoted (Borensztein & Mauro 2002), who suggested debt 
instruments indexed to countries’ real growth rate of their own GDP as a way to self-
insure against possible growth slowdowns.  
 
 A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Anne O. Krueger, International Monetary Fund, 
2002 ((Krueger 2002)). 
 In the context of reducing uncertainty regarding sovereign debt restructuring processes, (Amador et 
al. 2016), while mentioning the main proposals for default mechanisms presented so far, argue that  
“three  characteristics may be considered decisive” for the effective operation of insolvency 
mechanisms (in particular, clear definition of the events which trigger the process, minimisation of the 
“holdouts” amounts and its implementation should not be undermined by, for example, “the utilisation 
of other types of debt or amendments to the rules”.  
Moreover, Brooke and Mendes argue that the current approach to sovereign debt 
restructurings is “sub-optimal” (Brooke & Mendes 2013). They highlight five main 
reasons: i) it increases the risk of moral-hazard; ii) it incentivises short-term lending; 
iii) the risk to taxpayers’ resources; iv) the greater difficulty in the negotiation of 
debt write-downs, given substantial official sector debt holdings; and v) the delay of 
necessary reforms, which will require substantial policy adjustments when 
intervention is eventually needed (“gambling for redemption”). These authors 
proposed contractual reforms to sovereign debt contracts in order to improve crisis 
prevention and resolution, suggesting higher risk sharing between sovereigns and 
private creditors. Accordingly, they proposed the introduction of two complementary 
types of state-contingent bonds: ‘sovereign cocos’ and ‘GDP-linked bonds’.  The 
first would reduce the probability of solvency crises and the second serve to cover 
liquidity crises. 
 
Research on GDP-linked bonds seems to date back to the early 1990s with a proposal 
from Shiller (Shiller 1993), who defended a market for long-term claims on the 
major aggregate income flows: gross domestic product, occupational income, and 
service flows from commercial and residential real estate. Furthermore, he argued 
that instruments whose payments are linked to GDP could help reduce country risk 
and promote welfare.  
 
Borensztein and Mauro argue that GDP-indexed bonds, by keeping the debt/GDP 
ratio within a narrower range than plain vanilla bonds, could play a role in preventing 
future debt crises, representing a way for countries to self-insure against possible 
growth downturns (Borensztein & Mauro 2002; Borensztein & Mauro 2004). They 
also suggest that official intervention in the setting-up of the corresponding market 
could help overcome some of the obstacles to its implementation. Furthermore, it is 
illustrated how this product could reduce the need for countries to conduct 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies and their benefits for countries that belong to economic 
monetary unions. Finally, they also conclude that the insurance premium, that is the 
risk premium for holding bonds indexed to GDP, compensating investors for GDP 
volatility, would be small. In order to evaluate how markets would price this 
instrument, they use, as a starting point, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).   
 
As concerns pricing, and maintaining that GDP-indexed bonds are not much more 
difficult to price than plain-vanilla bonds, Chamon and Mauro (Chamon & Mauro 
2006) introduced the risk of default into their model. Firstly, they extracted different 
combinations of probabilities of default and recovery rates from observed yields. 
Then, using the Monte Carlo framework, they simulated several paths for economic 
variables and debt/GDP ratio. Afterwards, they obtained a default trigger for the 
debt/GDP ratio and recovery rate that would yield the expected repayments implicit 
in the spreads. Finally, using the debt/GDP ratio default trigger and the simulated 
paths for the economic variables, they computed the corresponding payoff for both 
the growth-indexed bonds and the standard plain-vanilla bonds. The authors 
concluded that GDP-indexed debt can lower default frequency and when the share of 
this type of debt increases, both plain-vanilla and growth-linked bonds become less 
sensitive to GDP volatility and to growth shocks. 
 
Miyajima (Miyajima 2006) evaluates GDP-linked warrants (GLWs) considering the 
issuer’s repayment capacity in the pricing formula. The author estimates the expected 
cash flows of debt payments, assuming that GDP follows a stochastic model, while 
trigger conditions are also modelled using the Monte Carlo framework. The issuer’s 
capacity to service debt is defined as the difference between the incremental 
payments of GLWs and the increases in tax revenues due to economic growth. 
Finally, (Miyajima 2006) also uses CAPM to calculate the size of the indexation 
premium, also finding it to be low (“lower than the results in the literature”). 
 
Sharma and Griffith-Jones (Sharma & Griffith-Jones 2009) discuss the benefits of 
introducing GDP-linked bonds to borrowing countries, investors and to the global 
economy and financial system, while presenting the main concerns, issues and 
obstacles to their implementation. They also present recent experiences with these 
types of bonds, explaining their major flaws. Finally, in the same vein as Borensztein 
and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), the authors also recognise the case for 
international public intervention to help develop a specific market, suggesting several 
steps forward to this end.  
 
Kamstra and Shiller (Kamstra & Shiller 2009) propose a particular type of GDP-
linked bond, a security with a coupon indexed to the United States’ current dollar 
GDP, that would pay, for example, one-trillionth of the GDP. The maturity of this 
security would be long term, preferably perpetual. They consider that this new 
instrument would perform an important role as a stabiliser of the public budget. 
Finally, the authors also use CAPM to calculate the cost of capital “relevant to 
issuing Trills”, culminating in a risk premium of “only” 1.5 percent.  
 
Recently, Barr et al. (Barr et al. 2014) have presented a model of endogenous 
sovereign default, in which they analyse how GDP-linked bonds can raise the 
maximum sustainable debt level of a government and reduce the incidence of 
defaults. They use the concept of fiscal fatigue and standard debt dynamics equations 
to estimate debt limits, which will then be determinant to model sovereign default 
with plain-vanilla and GDP-linked bonds. Under different risk aversion scenarios, 
the introduction of this security would increase the debt-limit level. In spite of this, 
investors demand a premium for providing insurance against GDP volatility. As the 
debt/GDP ratio increases, this specific cost gets overturned as default premium 
increases. 
 
Finally, Benford et al. (Benford et al. 2016) distinguish between GDP-linked bonds’ 
issuances in normal and in debt restructuring times, with different benefits for 
issuers. During normal times it would help in preventing solvency crises, giving 
more fiscal space in downturns. In restructurings, this instrument would allow 
transferring higher debt repayments to when growth is recovering.   
 
3. Introducing GDP-linked bonds – Design, effects and pricing  
3.1. Design – The coupon formula 
 
The specific feature of a GDP-linked bond is the indexation of its coupon rate to the 
issuer country’s GDP growth rate so that the security’s cash flow payments would 
reflect and adjust to the GDP evolution. In other words, the debt redemption’s value 
would reflect the country’s growth performance. If a government only issues this 
type of bond, all of its debt payments will change in line with growth.  





=max r + g
t
− g( ), 0 
Equation 1 
Specifically, in order for the coupon rate  to reflect the evolution of the GDP growth 
rate, an indexation factor, which would correspond to the difference between the 
observed growth rate (gt) and a baseline growth rate ( ), would be added to the 
baseline coupon rate (r), thus linking coupon payments to the mentioned economic 
performance. This baseline growth rate, to be agreed at the moment of the contract , 
would reflect a trend growth rate and would adjust the economic performance of the 
year t to a period of growth of sufficient length. As such, if the economy in year t 
grows above the baseline growth rate, the indexation factor would be positive and the 
coupon rate would be higher than the baseline coupon rate. If the economy grows 
below the baseline, the indexation factor would be negative and the coupon rate 
would be lower than r.  Finally, in order to protect investors from periods of 
particularly weak economic performance – when, by adjusting the baseline coupon 
rate to a sufficiently negative indexation factor, the coupon rate would be negative – 
and thus also avoiding disincentives to investments in this kind of performance-
linked security, a minimum of 0 would be applied to the coupon rate formula.  
 
Therefore, the indexation of a bond to a country’s economic performance would give 
governments a certain degree of insurance against periods of declining growth rates 
(to the extent that coupon payments are more or less sensitive to growth  and 
depending on the maturity of the bond ). 
  
3.2. Fiscal Effects of GDP-linked bonds 
 
 For simplicity and in order to avoid another layer of risk, only the coupon rate – and not the 
principal – is adjusted.  
 Borensztein and Mauro defend that the baseline growth rate of GDP would be agreed “upon by the 
contracting parties prior to the bonds’ issue” (Borensztein & Mauro 2004). 
 Borensztein and Mauro defend that the “higher the elasticity of bond payments with respect to 
changes in economic growth, the higher the insurance of the government” (Borensztein & Mauro 
2004). In this context, they note that the introduction of a positive minimum coupon payment reduces 
insurance and present other coupon formulas where a parameter  is added to control the elasticity of 
the coupon payment to the growth rate (e.g. ; where  
is an adjustable benchmark growth rate and  a maximum coupon payment). 
 According to Barr et al., GDP-linked bonds with longer maturities give sovereigns a better hedge 
against lower trend growth (Barr et al. 2014). As an example, perpetual GDP-linked bonds would 
hedge all the debt against those shocks.  
g
In order to quantify the insurance effect and to understand other potential fiscal 
benefits of GDP-linked bonds, a set of scenarios are presented, following some of the 
exercises laid out by Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004). In section 
1.2.1 “interest bill savings/expenses”, the savings or expenses are calculated for a 
group of countries (Portugal, Spain and Ireland) should they have issued GDP-
indexed bonds; in section 1.2.2 “avoiding procyclical fiscal measures”, also 
simulating that (a larger) group of countries had issued this growth-indexed 
instrument, it is illustrated how much additional room countries would have had to 
pursue countercyclical fiscal policies. Finally, in section 1.2.3 “introducing fiscal 
constraints”, that same additional room is simulated in the case of a fiscal deficit 
limit of 3% of GDP.       
Data used, its description as well as its sources are described in Table 1 below. 
 
Data Description Source 
GDP growth rate, 
real 
Gross Domestic Product, constant prices, annual 
percentage change 
IMF 
Primary balance Primary balance as a percentage of GDP; annual 
frequency 
IMF 
Overall balance Overall balance as a percentage of GDP; annual 
frequency 
IMF 
Interest Gross interest (paid) as a percentage of GDP; annual 
frequency  
IMF 
Debt General government gross debt; percentage of GDP IMF 
Table 1 Data description and sources 
3.2.1. Interest bill savings/expense 
This first exercise is an attempt, through a rather simple approach, to illustrate how 
GDP-indexed bonds could affect a sovereign’s interest bill. Following Borensztein 
and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), it is employed a floating-rate bond with a 
coupon rate that follows a country’s economic performance.  
 
In this context, using equation 1 presented in 1.1, a new coupon rate is simulated and, 
accordingly, the amount of interest savings (or expenses) accumulated (or incurred) 
if, since the beginning of 1999, all the government debt of some of the European 
countries most affected by the recent sovereign debt crisis - Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain - consisted of GDP-linked bonds. It is also assumed that the new coupon rate 
and interest bill would have no impact on other variables, such as GDP, total deficit 
or debt, which, although unrealistic, is a good indicator of the expected potential 
amount of interest savings or expenses. Moreover, the baseline growth rate used 
corresponds to the average growth rate in the period 1980-2013, which, according to 
(Borensztein & Mauro 2004), “could be viewed as a mix of adaptive expectations 
and perfect foresight” ; and should be long enough to provide a representative figure 
of the growth trend of a country. As regards GDP growth, it was chosen data in real 
terms, i.e. adjusted for inflation effects. It is arguable that GDP in nominal terms (as 
suggested by Benford et al. (Benford et al. 2016)) would protect investors also from 
inflation fluctuations, however, it seems more prudent (at least in a first period of 
issuance) to spare both investors and issuers of another layer of complexity and risk 
and focusing on the countercyclical potential effect of GDP-linked bonds.    
 
As such, the actual implicit coupon rate is determined as a result of the ratio of gross 
interest payments of year t to the average of that same year’s debt and the one of year 
t-1. However, it should be noted that this ratio does not consider that the actual debt 
stock also includes other instruments (such as currency and deposits and loans). 
Also, one should take into account that countries that were under financial assistance 
were excluded from the bond market, contributing for a less meaningful coupon rate. 
The difference between that year’s GDP growth rate and the baseline growth rate is 
then added (or subtracted) to the coupon rate and the maximum of the adjusted 
coupon rate and 0 is computed. The new interest amount can thus be determined by 
applying that new coupon rate to the same average of year t and year t-1 debt. 
 
In the case of Portugal, the baseline growth rate would be 2.2%, which compares to a 
rather low average growth rate of around 0.3% in the more recent period 2000-2013 
(Figure 1). This would suggest that, had the Portuguese government issued 
GDP-linked bonds, it would have paid an average coupon rate of around 3.0%, 
which is lower than the average observed (coupon) rate of around 4.5%.  
 
In relatively good years - when the growth rate was higher than the baseline - the 
government would have incurred comparatively higher interest costs. This would 
have happened only in 2000 and in 2007. Conversely, in periods when the GDP 
 Although asserting that economic agents have perfect foresight is a strong assumption, it allows for 
the consideration of expectations. However, this assumption has limited impact in this and the 
following exercises given that growth expectations are the same regardless of the fiscal policy 
adopted. 
growth rate was below the baseline, the adjusted coupon rate would have been lower 
than the observed one, resulting in (the emergence of) interest savings. In periods of 
particularly low growth, including periods of negative growth rates, for instance from 
2007 onwards (excluding 2010), the GDP-indexed debt would have translated into 
significant interest savings. This period coincided with the European sovereign debt 
crisis. The reduction in the government’s interest bill (amounting to around 1.4% of 
GDP during the period from 2000 to 2013) would have left room to avoid or 
minimize procyclical fiscal measures. The amount of savings generated could have 
been particularly useful for this country, in light of the significant fiscal and 
macroeconomic adjustment pursued during this period. 
 
Figure 1 Interest savings over the economic cycle 2000-2013 – Portugal 
  
The circumstantial value that GDP-linked bonds could have yielded to Portugal can 
be extended to other European countries, also heavily affected by the European 
sovereign debt crisis, such as Spain and Ireland.  
 
In Spain (Figure 2), a particularly poor economic performance period can be 
observed from 2008 onwards, with negative growth rates in 2009 and in the period 
2011-2013 (in 2010 the GDP growth rate was close to zero). In this period (2008-
2013), GDP-indexed bonds would have generated significant interest savings 
compared to the amount of interest effectively paid, representing a saving of around 
2.3% of GDP. From 2009 onwards (when the growth rate declined to around -3.6%), 
coupon rates would actually fall to their minimum level of zero. For the all sample 
period, considering also years when GDP growth was relatively high and stable, 
interest savings amounted to around 1.0% of GDP.  
 
Figure 2 Interest savings over the economic cycle 2000-2013 – Spain 
Finally, Ireland (Figure 3) exhibited rather low growth rates from 2007 onwards, in 
particular between 2008 and 2012, but coming from a period of high GDP growth 
compared to the growth rate of the euro area as a whole. In the period 2008-2013, if 
Ireland were to have issued GDP-indexed bonds, it would have saved around 2.4% of 
GDP in interests. In the entire sample period, Ireland would have saved 0.6% of 
GDP. 
Figure 3 Interest savings over the economic cycle 2000-2013 – Ireland 
 
As illustrated above, and in line with the conclusions of Borensztein and Mauro 
(Borensztein & Mauro 2004), when GDP growth rate is below the baseline rate, the 
government generates interest savings with GDP-linked bonds as opposed to its 
interest bill with regular, non-indexed bonds. This would give room for pursuing 
policies that would result in a lower primary surplus (higher spending and/or lower 
taxes). It could also allow countries, in particular those that are following a short-
term fiscal adjustment path, to achieve their goals faster. This could have applied to 
the countries presented above. All three underwent strong fiscal adjustments in order 
to restore fiscal sustainability, most notably Ireland and Portugal, both of which lost 
market access and had to rely on the funding of international institutions and to 
pursue a set of reforms in the context of adjustment programmes.  Overall, 
GDP-indexed bonds would provide countries with more fiscal space in times of crisis 
(Brooke & Mendes 2013). 
 
The literature seems somewhat divided regarding the impact of fiscal consolidation 
on growth. On the one hand, Kleis and Moessinger (Kleis & Moessinger 2016) 
depict two possible channels, on the demand side, for “expansionary effects” of 
fiscal consolidations: (i) the increase of consumers’ expectations, considering that 
current tax increases can be perceived as future lower taxes, thus increasing present 
private consumption; and (ii) a lower sovereign risk premia, stemming from a 
credible fiscal consolidation, which reduces a country’s probability of default or debt 
restructuring. On the other hand, Yang et al. (Yang et al. 2015), through a new 
definition of cyclically adjusted primary balance, conclude that “fiscal adjustments 
always have contractionary effects on economic activity in the short term” and find 
no evidence of expansionary fiscal adjustments. Notwithstanding this discussion, one 
can conclude that the increased “fiscal space” stemming from the issuance of GDP-
linked bonds could contribute to reduce, or even avoid, potential contractionary 
effects of fiscal consolidation. 
 
Furthermore, GDP-linked bonds, by increasing this fiscal space, would also allow 
delaying the moment from which the responsiveness of the primary balance to higher 
debt levels would start weakening. This would be a useful “weapon” for those 
countries struggling to achieve fiscal sustainability. Ghosh et al. (Ghosh et al. 2011) 
apply this concept of “fiscal fatigue”. Through a framework designed for assessing 
debt sustainability in a set of advanced economies, the authors find evidence on the 
existence of a non-linear relationship between primary balance and public debt, i.e. 
as debt increases, the primary balance also increases, but its responsiveness 
deteriorates and even decreases at high levels of debt. 
 
Finally, in times when GDP growth rate grows above the baseline, this would 
translate into higher interest expenses compared to non-indexed bonds. In these 
instances, the government, assuming that it were to maintain its overall fiscal deficit, 
would need to have a higher primary surplus (lower spending and/or higher taxes) if 
issuing GDP-indexed bonds as opposed to regular issuances. It could be argued that 
this may have a disciplinary effect, preventing governments from overspending. 
 
3.2.2. Fiscal policy 
3.2.2.1. Avoiding procyclical fiscal measures 
 
In the previous exercise, interest bill savings/expenses were estimated for GDP-
indexed bonds, as opposed to plain-vanilla bonds, for some of the European 
countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis. It was then concluded that, for 
the period 2000-2013, GDP-indexed debt would, on average, generate savings, 
increasing countries’ fiscal space, which would give room to at least minimize 
procyclical fiscal policies.  
 
Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), in an attempt to illustrate 
further the benefits of GDP-linked bonds for emerging markets and advanced 
economies, present another exercise quantifying “how much additional room would 
countries have had for countercyclical fiscal policy if their debt had been indexed to 
GDP (…) ?”. This is calculated by simulating the primary surplus that would have 
been obtained if all of a country’s debt had been indexed to GDP growth. For that 
purpose, it was assumed that the total deficit, debt paths and economic growth would 
be the same as observed. It is thus assumed that, ceteris paribus, the interest savings 
or expenses stemming from the issuance of GDP-linked bonds would have a direct 
and proportional impact on the fiscal policy and thus on the primary balance. Other 
effects of a different fiscal policy, such as those relating to economic growth or risk 
premia, are not considered.  
 
Specifically, following Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), the 
exercise considers that, in 1999, the entire debt stock had been indexed to GDP for 
20 advanced countries  and 25 emerging market countries . The implied interest 
rate was calculated as a ratio between the interest bill (taking gross interest payments 
into consideration) and the average between the previous and the current year’s debt 
stock. The “new interest rate” is simulated by applying the already discussed 
formula  and adding the implied interest rate to the “indexation factor”, as 
previously described. The new interest amount is computed by multiplying that “new 
interest rate” by that year’s debt. The baseline growth rate corresponds to the 
geometric mean of the growth rates between 1980 and 2013. 
 
Finally, after calculating the “adjusted primary balance” (resulting from the 
introduction of GDP-linked bonds and considering again the strong assumption that 
economic growth and fiscal variables are maintained) by adding the new interests to 
 The exact question as asked by Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004) is “how much 
additional room would countries had been indexed to GDP at the beginning of the 1990s?”. The 
question now asked is similar, but with a different timeframe.   
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Portugal was added to the Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004) 
sample. 
 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South 
Africa, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
   coupon
t
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the observed overall balance, the correlation between primary balance and growth 
rate is computed. The correlation between these two variables can be understood as 
an indicator of a government’s “room for manoeuvre” or ability to conduct 
countercyclical fiscal policy. Moreover, this correlation is compared to the 
correlation between the variables, but based on actual data. The results are reported 
in Table 2. 
 









Mean 0.30 0.67 0.53 0.72 
Median 0.34 0.76 0.52 0.73 
Sources: International Monetary Fund database, IMF Country Reports and author’s calculations 
Table 2 Correlation between the primary balance and real GDP growth, 2000-2013 
 
In fact, and in line with the conclusions of Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & 
Mauro 2004) for a quite different period, the correlation between the primary balance 
and GDP growth would be significantly higher with indexation than without it. The 
increase in the correlation between these two variables seems more pronounced in 
emerging markets than in advanced economies, coming from low levels of 
correlation when considering the actual data, indicating that emerging markets follow 
a less countercyclical fiscal policy. This is in line with conclusions from the IMF 
(IMF 2015) that fiscal policies have been less stabilising in emerging markets and 
developing countries than in advanced economies, reflecting, for instance, “less 
potent fiscal instruments, and the prominence of policy objectives other than output 
stability”.  
 
Behind the supposed benefit of a higher correlation between primary balance and 
GDP growth is the already mentioned increased fiscal space given by GDP-linked 
bonds - it would potentially have a stabilising effect on fiscal policy: fiscal balance 
increases when output rises and decreases when it falls. If that happens, and 
according to the IMF (IMF 2015), fiscal policy can produce additional demand when 
output is contracting and less demand when the economy is expanding. Also 
according to the IMF, fiscal stabilisation reduces the volatility of growth over the 
business cycle. The institution estimates a potential decrease of around 20% of 
overall growth volatility for advanced economies, stemming from the move from 
average to high fiscal stabilisation and a reduction of around 5% in the case of 
emerging market and developing countries. This is particularly important considering 
that higher fiscal stabilisation and thus a lower level of growth volatility results in 
higher medium-term growth: “an average strengthening of fiscal stabilization – that 
is, an increase in the fiscal stabilization measure  by one standard deviation in the 
sample – could on average boost annual growth rates by 0.1 percentage point in 
developing economies and 0.3 percentage point in advanced economies”.  
 
This stabilisation effect of GDP-linked bonds can be considered an automatic tool  
given their immediate and countercyclical fiscal reaction to growth - giving room for 
the typical automatic stabilisers to work freely during downturns and upturns.  
 
Although it seems to be a general belief that countercyclical fiscal policy has a 
stabilising effect, other aspects of its impact deserve further discussion. Gordon and 
Leeper (Gordon & Leeper 2005) argue that countercyclical fiscal policies generate 
dynamic links between current and future policies and thus they can be 
counterproductive by creating a business cycle when there would be no cycle in the 
absence of countercyclical policies. Economic agents will adjust their decisions on 
savings and investment according to expected policy decisions, which could 
exacerbate and prolong recessions. Furthermore, during economic downturns, 
countercyclical policies could increase government debt, which would raise future 
debt obligations. The IMF (IMF 2015), despite clearly identifying the benefits of 
fiscal stabilisation, also acknowledges that it is not always a priority or a desirable 
objective - restoring the credibility of public finance sustainability, for example, 
could be, in a given moment, the main and proper goal. Moreover, the IMF maintains 
that a fiscal response may not always be the best solution to smooth output 
fluctuations. Fiscal measures are suitable for output shocks that affect aggregate 
demand, and may not be appropriate for those that affect relative prices. Also, fiscal 
measures usually demand time to implement due to, for instance, legislative 
requirements; furthermore lags in acknowledging the need for action are frequent. 
 
 According to the IMF (IMF 2015), fiscal stabilisation can be measured by the sensitivity of the 
overall budget balance to the output gap. 
 Vide IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2015 ((IMF 2015)) for advantages and disadvantages of automatic 
and non-automatic stabilisers.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that GDP-linked bonds offer a symmetric fiscal 
adjustment  – as is also defended in (IMF 2015). They limit fiscal stimulus by 
channelling fiscal revenues to interest expenses in good times, thus reducing the risk 
of overheating and at the same time relieving governments from the pressure of 
interest payments in bad times. During the course of the latter, although offering an 
increase of the debt limit, this instrument could also represent a disincentive to 
excessive indebtedness, given that the debt contracted during those times will 
represent extra interest bills during recoveries.  
 
3.2.2.2. Introducing fiscal constraints 
The subsequent exercise, as carried out by Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & 
Mauro 2004), attempts to illustrate the special benefits of GDP-indexed bonds for 
countries that belong to currency unions, such as the euro area.  
 
This instrument could be of particular interest to those countries given that they have 
lost, individually, the possibility of using monetary policy. In such cases, the natural 
solution to control business cycle fluctuations – fighting economic downturns or 
curbing excesses – is through the use of fiscal policy. This could also be relevant for 
countries that face constraints on other fiscal variables, such as those imposed by the 
European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact.  
 
In this context, the exercise assumes that France, Spain and Portugal had complied 
with the 3% of GDP limit on the fiscal deficit – imposing this limit each time that it 
was exceeded in actual data – starting in 2000 until 2013. Then, calculating the 
implied interest rate (as a result of the ratio of current year gross interests to the 
average of the previous and current year debt stocks) and assuming no feedback from 
the different deficit and debt levels on the interest rate or on growth, a new debt path 
is computed following Equation 2, which is based on the sovereign debt dynamics 
equation. As a result, an adjusted primary balance, taking into account the 3% of 




In the equation above,  corresponds to government debt,  to output,  to the 
primary surplus as a share of GDP,  is the growth rate, and  is the interest rate (in 
this case, the implied interest rate).   
 
Following those same paths for debt and total deficits, a new primary balance is 
computed, but now supposing that all the debt stock was indexed to GDP growth. 
The correlation between primary balance and growth is then calculated in different 
scenarios: “with SGP ” (i.e. with a 3% limit in total deficit and ignoring other SGP 
constraints and specificities) and, considering this constraint, debt with and without 
GDP growth indexation. Finally, these values are compared to those without the 
above-mentioned fiscal limit. The results are reported in Table 3. 
 
















0.63 0.82 0.93 0.95 0.21 0.70 
With SGP 0.53 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.04 0.97 
Source: International Monetary Fund database, IMF Country Reports and author’s calculations 
Table 3 Correlation between the primary balance and real GDP growth, 2000-2013 
 
As illustrated in the table above, one can conclude that, without indexing debt to 
GDP growth, a constraint of 3% of GDP in the total deficit would reduce a country’s 
ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies.  For France, applying this constraint 
would reduce the correlation between the primary balance and growth from 0.63 to 
0.53, in the case of Spain from 0.93 to 0.87 and for Portugal, from 0.21 to 0.04. This 
is understandable given that during downturns the possibility to increase the fiscal 
deficit (decreasing taxes and/or increasing expenditure) would be constrained. 
Following the previous exercise, another natural conclusion is that the indexation of 
debt to GDP growth would again further allow for governments to avoid or mitigate 
procyclical fiscal policies in each (given) scenario. And, in that vein, the correlation 
between primary balance and GDP growth would increase. This holds true for the 
three simulated cases.   
 
 SGP stands for Stability and Growth Pact. 
When comparing correlation results of primary balance with debt indexed to GDP 
growth and with a 3% limit of GDP in the standard scenario (correlation between 
primary balance, without deficit constraint and no debt indexed to GDP and GDP 
growth), in the case of Spain, it would have totally offset the effect of the 3% 
constraint. In the other two examples, France and Portugal, it would have more than 
compensated for this effect. This means that indexing debt to GDP growth would 
give more room to countercyclical fiscal policies in any case and, even with a fiscal 
constraint (when these fiscal policies are limited), this room could be even higher 
compared to the standard scenario of no debt indexed to GDP and no constraint.  
 
However, these conclusions should be considered, to a certain extent, in light of the 
artificiality of the exercise. Both in the case of France and Portugal, the 3% GDP 
limit would have been biding for a large period of the sample (for Portugal it would 
have been biding throughout the entire sample period), making the comparison with 
the standard scenario less credible. In this context, when indexing debt to GDP 
growth, and assuming that those countries would have complied with the defined 
constraint, changes in primary balance would more easily follow the evolution of 
growth, in particular during upturns. 
 
3.3. Pricing - Indexation Premium 
When presenting a new type of financial instrument, it is crucial to discuss its 
pricing, in particular the cost of capital relevant to issuing GDP-linked bonds. As 
such, the premium above the risk-free rate that investors would demand for holding 
GDP-linked bonds in their portfolios should be estimated. Kamstra and Shiller 
(Kamstra & Shiller 2009) while arguing that an instrument that transfers risk from 
investors to issuers is more valued by investors and thus implies lower costs for the 
issuer, also recognise that “it seems likely that the cost of issuing Trills  would be 
higher than that of issuing fixed-coupon, inflation-protected debt ”. They also 
defend that “the Trill exposes domestic investors to systematic risk and insures the 
 “Trills”, as proposed by Kamstra and Shiller (Kamstra & Shiller 2009), would be a U.S. 
government debt security with a coupon tied to the United States’ current dollar GDP, paying one-
trillionth of the GDP. It would be long in maturity, ideally perpetual.  
 Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) are a government debt instrument that is indexed to 
inflation (as issued by the U.S. Government, the principal increases with inflation and decreases with 
deflation, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers) and thus protecting investors from inflation risk. 
government against it”. In this vein, they also acknowledge that if foreign investors 
hold Trills, the compensation for bearing that risk would probably be low – 
considering that the GDPs of those investors’ countries are not highly correlated with 
U.S. GDP. In order to calculate the cost of capital for issuing Trills, they, among 
other methods, estimate the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s (CAPM) beta with the 
purpose of calculating the degree of correlation between the return on the Trill and 
the market return. As such, by measuring the amount of the S&P 500 index return in 
excess of the Treasury bill return, the market excess return, CAPM regression 
indicates that the security proposed is a low-risk asset (with a beta close to 0.25 and a 
risk premium of 1.5%).  
 
Miyajima (Miyajima 2006) also concludes that an indexation premium of a GDP-
linked warrant is expected to be low. He uses the mean-variance CAPM and 
Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM), estimating beta only for 
foreign investors , assuming they are U.S. dollar-based investors and with portfolios 
that are highly correlated with GDP-growth of the U.S. or the return to S&P stock 
index.  Through CAPM, he obtained beta values ranging from 0 to 0.06. These low 
values were confirmed by CCAPM.  
 
Already in 2002, Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2002), based on the 
argument that income growth rates do not present high degrees of correlation among 
countries, argue that there are unrealised gains from international risk sharing. In this 
vein, they also use the CAPM in order to estimate GDP-indexed bonds’ insurance 
premium, also obtaining (possible) low values.  
 
In this context, it should be mentioned that the CAPM considers two types of risks 
inherent to a certain individual asset: a systematic risk, stemming from holding a 
market portfolio, being subject to its own market-related risks (e.g. interest rates) and 
that cannot be diversified away; and an unsystematic risk, which can be diversified 
away by increasing the number of securities of a portfolio. The latter type of risk is 
considered to be specific of an individual asset. Only the systematic component is 
reflected in expected returns, since the unsystematic risk can be eliminated by 
portfolio diversification.  
 The author argues that “there are no well-defined domestic asset prices” for the hypothetical issuer 
country.  
 
As such, and following Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), the 
return on a GDP-indexed bond would be given by: 
 
Equation 3
Where R is the interest rate on plain-vanilla bonds,  the degree of indexation or the 
return elasticity to the growth rate,  corresponds to the actual growth rate and  to 
the trend growth.  
 
Conforming to CAPM and according to the same authors, the expected return on 




Where  corresponds to the risk-free rate,  to the market portfolio return and  is 




Using the above equations to determine the return on GDP-indexed bonds (where  















In order to determine the above-mentioned systematic portion of risk related to a 
country’s GDP growth rate and using the “world real GDP”, as suggested by 
(Borensztein & Mauro 2004) , as representative of the ‘market portfolio’, simple 
regressions (for the period 1980-2015) of individual countries’ GDP growth rates on 
the world real GDP rates were conducted indicating a low portion of undiversified 
risk. The results are shown in the Table 4 below. 
 
World Real GDP growth 
 R2 Coeff Std. error 
Advanced countries 
Median 0.209 0.772 0.230 
Average 0.209 0.761 0.266 
Average of Abs (1-coeff) - 0.328 - 
Emerging markets 
Median 0.079 0.754 0.499 
Average 0.097 0.822 0.554 
Average of Abs (1-coeff) - 0.446 - 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database and author’s calculations 
Table 4 Comovement of individual country real GDP growth with world market portfolio (the 
sample consisted of 25 Emerging Markets and 21 Advanced Economies)  
 
For advanced countries, the R2 ranges from 0.009 (Portugal) to 0.355 (Germany) 
with an average of 0.209. Beta coefficients vary from 0.211 (Portugal) to 1.377 
(Finland), with an average of 0.761. In the case of emerging markets, R2 ranges from 
0.002 (China) to 0.288 (South Africa), with an average of 0.097; beta coefficients 
vary from -0.590 (Côte d’Ivoire) to 1.189 (Venezuela), with an average of 0.822. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the systematic part related to “GDP-risk” would be 
small, and, considering the low values of beta coefficients (on average lower than 1), 
and despite the also low R2, that the indexation premium would also be small.  
 
 (Borensztein & Mauro 2004) consider “world GDP growth”, “US GDP growth”, “world real stock 
returns” and “US real stock returns” as “reasonable candidates” for the ‘market portfolio’ return 
representative.  
Finally, it should be noted that this indexation premium – stemming from the 
application of the calculated beta coefficients to equation (e) – compensates investors 
for holding bonds linked to the GDP growth rate, in addition to the plain-vanilla 
default risk and assuming no correlation between these two risks (default risk and 
GDP growth risk). However, since GDP-linked bonds reduce the probability of 
default and raise the maximum sustainable level of debt, it is possible to relax this 
assumption. It is likely that, for certain levels of debt, the overall risk of GDP-linked 
bonds would be lower than plain-vanilla bonds. Barr et al. (Barr et al. 2014) defend 
that as the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the cost of the GDP-volatility insurance 
premium “gets overturned” as the lower debt limit of plain-vanilla bonds increases 
their default premium, while that of GDP-indexed bonds would not change. They 
admit that in some circumstances, “when debt approaches the debt limit, the credit 
spread on conventional bonds can exceed the GDP risk premium”, and thus it would 
be cheaper to issue GDP-linked bonds than the regular ones.  
 
4. Previous issuances, barriers to implementation and possible 
solutions 
The introduction of GDP-linked bonds, as laid out in the previous sections, could be 
beneficial for borrowing countries. They could play an important role in avoiding 
solvency crises by, inter alia, increasing countries’ fiscal space and allowing for 
countercyclical fiscal policies. As such, defaults, debt restructurings and their 
associated costs could be mitigated. According to Forni et al. (Forni et al. 2016), 
sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors can, in fact, affect per 
capita GDP growth in the years after a restructuring. These benefits also affect both 
investors - avoiding losing invested capital and costly litigations in the case of 
restructurings and giving them the chance of investing on countries’ future growth 
prospects (Sharma & Griffith-Jones 2009) – and the international financial system as 
a whole – reducing growth and capital flows volatility.  
 
Cabrillac et al. (Cabrillac et al. 2017) determined the gains for issuers and investors 
of GDP-linked bonds. As such, they concluded that the debt-to-GDP ratio would be 
reduced by 15% on average for a 25-year horizon for the 95th percentiles (5% least 
favourable) of the simulated debt paths. They also concluded that the volatility of the 
investor’s portfolio would potentially decrease by 12% on average given the 
investment of such an instrument instead of investing in equities.  
 
Also, according to one of the principles  for selecting individual issues of fixed-
value type as put out by Graham and Dodd (Graham & Dodd 2009), “this ability [of 
the issuer to meet all of its obligations] should be measured under conditions of 
depression rather prosperity”. Indeed, during crisis, when, for instances, there are 
output contractions, GDP-linked bonds, by, inter alia, decreasing the interest amount 
a government has to pay, make a country more able to pay its obligations, making it 
and this product more appealing to investors. 
 
Notwithstanding the advantages mentioned, the fact is that the issuance of similar 
instruments is considered an exception and has not been common on financial 
markets (Cabrillac et al. 2017).  
 
4.1. Previous issuances of sovereign’s equity-like instruments 
As literature about equity-like instruments has been evolving, the issuance of this 
kind of products has also been somewhat progressing. In the end-1980s, as part of its 
debt relief within the “Brady Plan” , Mexico pursued a debt-equity conversion 
program under which creditors (in this case, commercial banks) would be entitled to 
receive oil revenues owned to the country if its price would exceed a certain amount. 
Also within the Brady Plan, other countries, such as Venezuela, Nigeria or Uruguay 
have issued similar equity-like instruments. Later in the 1990s, still part of the same 
plan, other countries such as Costa Rica and Bulgaria issued bonds for sovereign 
funding purposes, whose repayment was indexed to GDP, i.e. its payoff increased if 
 This is the second out of four principles, namely: (i) “safety is measured not by a specific lien or 
other contractual rights, but by the ability of the issuer to meet all of its obligations”, (iii) “deficient 
safety cannot be compensated for by an abnormally high coupon rate” and (iv) “the selection of all 
bonds for investment should be subject to rules of exclusion and to specific quantitative tests 
corresponding to those prescribed by statute to govern investments of savings banks.  
 The Brady Plan was announced in 1989 by US Secretary of Treasury, Nicholas Brady in the 
context of the developing countries’ debt crisis in the 1980s, which led some of them to default. As 
such, countries were settling rescheduling agreements with commercial banks, but without haircuts. 
The Plan, which was later (financially) supported by the IMF and the World Bank, consisted of debt 
reduction programs as a contribution to solving the above-mentioned crisis. The Brady Plan foresaw 
(i) exchange of outstanding bank loans into new sovereign bonds, partially collateralized by US 
Treasury bonds; (ii) a range of options of new instruments, such as discount bonds with a reduction in 
the face value, and par bonds with long maturities and below-market interest rates but no debt 
reduction and (iii) capitalization of interest in arrears to commercial banks into new short-term 
floating rates ((Trebesch et al. 2012)). 
GDP (or GDP per capita) of those issuing countries rose above a certain threshold. 
There are other examples of GDP-linked warrants’ issuance, such as Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Singapore and more recently by Argentina, Greece and Ukraine. 





Bulgaria   As a consequence of Bulgaria’s (external) debt crisis. 
 In 1944 Bulgaria signed a Brady contract for the reduction and restructuring of its 
debt. 
 Within the restructuring deal there was a clause for recovery of the value and payment 
was triggered if: (a) current GDP was equal or higher than 125% of GDP in 1993 and 
(b) there was a GDP increase compared to the previous year. 
 If those conditions were met, the extra interest rate would be half of the GDP 
percentage increase (paid in the addition to the underlying plain vanilla coupon).  
 According to (Miyajima 2006) the source of reference data and GDP measurement 
units is “ambiguous” and the corresponding term sheet is not clear in the units of 
measurement.  
 These warrants were ‘callable’ and were inseparable from the plain vanilla bonds. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
 In the sequence of the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) that, among other disastrous 
consequences, led to a significant fall in GDP. The country inherited a legacy of 
disadvantageous conditions from Yugoslavia, among which, (partially) a considerable 
high external debt.  
 In 1997 an agreement on the debt restructuring was achieved and a GDP-performance 
bond was “settled”.  
 According to (Miyajima 2006) payment on this GDP-warrants would be triggered if: 
(a) GDP would hit a predetermined target level and would remain at such level for two 
years and (b) GDP per capita would rise above US$2.80 in 1997 units, adjusted for 
German consumer price inflation 
 Also according to the same author, this instrument suffered from poor design and low 
quality data. 
 As the Bulgarian GLWs, were also inseparable from the plain vanilla bonds. 
Singapore   Issuance to low-income citizens of two sets of shares linking payments to GDP-growth 
(neither tradable nor transferable and could be exchanged only for cash with the 
government). 
 The first share – the New Singapore Shares (NSS) – was introduced in 2011 with the 
purpose of helping the lower-income group during economic downturns. 
 It consists of annual dividends (on outstanding balances) in the form of bonus shares 
with a guaranteed 3% minimum rate. An extra dividend, when applicable, corresponds 
to the real GDP growth rate (if positive) of the previous year.  
 The second share – the Economic Restructuring Shares (ERS) – were issued with the 
aim of subsidizing citizens given the Goods and Services Tax increase from 3% to 5%.  
 Calculation of bonuses is similar to the one of NSS.  
Argentina   Following a period of a severe economic and financial crisis, Argentina defaulted in its 
sovereign debt obligations by US$82 billion.  
 After a period of hard negotiations with bondholders of the defaulted debt, in 2005 a 
debt restructuring was accepted by 76% of them, leading to a bond exchange of 
US$62 billion in principal.  
 It included 30-year GDP-linked warrants (GDWs) that were attached, for a period of 
180 days, to the new bonds.  
 GLWs had no principal and, after the above-mentioned period, could act as “series of 
standalone, state-contingent coupons”. 
 These instruments were issued in different countries and currencies.  
 The GLWs would pay annually 5% of excess GDP (defined as the difference between 
actual real GDP and Base Case real GDP, converted to nominal pesos ) if all the 
 (Pirian 2003), (Miyajima 2006). 
 (Stumpf 2010), (Miyajima 2006). 
 (Government of Singapore - Ministry of Finance 2008), (Miyajima 2006). 
 (Benford et al. 2016), (Miyajima 2006). 
following conditions were to be met: (a) actual GDP, expressed in constant peso terms 
as of the reference date (the year before the one in which payments occur), exceeds the 
Base Case GDP; (b) the annual growth rates of actual GDP, expressed in constant peso 
terms as of the reference date, also exceed the Base Case GDP for that year. The 
growth rate was set at 4.3% for 2005, declining thereafter, reaching 3% from 2015 to 
2034; and (c) total cumulative payments should not exceed a payment limit of 48 cents 
per dollar of notional amount. 
Greece   The Greek sovereign debt crisis led to the 2012 debt restructuring, which included a 
debt relief of over 50% of that year’s GDP.  
 Within the restructuring package, the new bonds included a set of detachable GDP-
linked securities, which could yield an increase in the coupon of up to 1%  if  
(a) nominal GDP in the previous year equals or exceeds the Reference Nominal GDP; 
(b) real GDP growth equals or exceeds the Reference Real GDP Growth Rate; (c) real 
GDP growth equals or exceeds 0.  
 The warrants have a face value, which first equals the face value of the new bond and 
is reduced by about 5% per year from 2024 to 2042. The principal is used to determine 
the annual payments, i.e., holders are not entitled to receive it. 
  The warrants are callable from 2020 on, based on a trailing 30-day market price. 
Table 4. Characteristics of bonds with GDP-indexed features issued so far 
 
Overall, these issuances were mainly done in the context of debt restructurings and 
often attached and inseparable from a plain vanilla bond. Furthermore, their 
indexation formulas and conditions have usually been exceedingly complex, lacking 
standardization and clarity on the underlying reference data, as in the case of 
Bulgaria. In the case of Argentina, for example, as put out by Benford et al. (Benford 
et al. 2016), the 350-day time lag between the reference (when payment is 
calculated) and payment date reduces the countercyclical effect and also suffers from 
great complexity.   
 
In this vein, in addition to design issues (as complexity and lack of standardization, 
already mentioned above), it seems that, not less importantly so far, no sovereign has 
issued a GDP-linked bond that fully shares its risk between debtors (sovereigns) and 
creditors (investors) and whose returns would vary symmetrically according to GDP 
fluctuation. 
 
4.2. Barriers to implementation and possible solutions 
 
Notwithstanding the already described benefits of a possible issuance of GDP-linked 
bonds, there are some obstacles to its implementation and operationalization.  
 
The main concern regards GDP data, in particular inaccuracies in its measurement 
and constant revisions (changes for including more accurate information and also 
 (Zettelmeyer et al. 2013).  
 Payment amount = [1.5 (Real GDP Growth Rate – Reference Real GDP Growth Rate)] x Notional  
those resulting from methodological shifts (Cecchetti & Schoenholtz 2017), and the 
possibility of misreporting.  Indeed, data transparency and integrity is crucial from 
the investor point of view. In this context, increased independence of statistical 
agencies and technical support from international institutions could be decisive in 
guaranteeing the reliability of data, the accomplishment of statistical standards and 
conveying credibility to investors. The risk of reporting manipulated data, however, 
seems somewhat contained by eventual reputational effects to the issuing sovereign. 
According to Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 2004), the success given 
to politicians by high growth rates is what gets them re-elected and thus it would not 
be reasonable to report, at least for several years, understated growth rates. 
Concerning data revisions, authors, such as Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & 
Mauro 2004), Sharma and Griffith-Jones (Sharma & Griffith-Jones 2009) and 
Brooke and Mendes (Brooke & Mendes 2013) suggest similar solutions to overcome 
this obstacle: establishing ex-ante (i.e. in the bond contract) the reference period for 
GDP data (lagged data of the period x, which, according to (Benford et al. 2016) 
could be a six-month lag, while Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (Cecchetti & Schoenholtz 
2017) consider this period “inadequate”). This lag period should be long enough to 
have more accurate/ precise estimations, but not too long so that the countercyclical 
effect would not be lost.  
 
Another obstacle is the absence of such a market and the corresponding concern with 
sufficient liquidity. According to Sharma and Griffith-Jones (Sharma & Griffith-
Jones 2009) markets could be illiquid for this type of relatively new instrument. In 
this vein, and in line with these authors, there may be the need for a coordinated 
approach of several borrowers and institutions. This coordination should be both in 
terms of timing of issuance and conditions, following a standard design.  
 
Moreover, it is arguable that such a new product, with an additional layer of 
complexity when compared to a plain vanilla bond, would make it difficult to price, 
thus alienating investors. A possible way to overcome this obstacle could be by both 
designing a simple and standard instrument and having the technical support in 
pricing such a product. 
 
Finally, as defended by Sharma and Griffith-Jones (Sharma & Griffith-Jones 2009) 
there could also be a moral hazard effect, since higher GDP growth leads to higher 
interest payments, governments could have less incentive to implement policies to 
foster growth. This, however, as the risk of data manipulation, does not seem 
probable in the sense that lower growth would cost politicians both credibility and 
popularity.  
 
Given the solutions to the obstacles presented above it is clear that international 
financial institutions could play a crucial role in overcoming them, namely by giving 
statistical support - technical when needed, monitoring data integrity or as an anchor, 
using its published data as a reference –, by designing a GDP-linked bond prototype, 
which could act as a standard model and by using its technical knowledge in what 
concerns pricing. Their role, however, could be pushed even further. As defended by 
Sharma and Griffith-Jones (Sharma & Griffith-Jones 2009) multilateral or regional 
development could develop a portfolio of loans, whose repayments would be linked 
to the debtor country growth rate. These loans could be then securitized and sold on 
the international financial markets. International Financial Institutions, like the 
International Monetary Fund, already play an important role by giving financial 
assistance to countries (in the case of this institution, for instance, helping members 
to resolve balance of payment difficulties). As such, when a country loses access to 
financial markets and need IMF financing, this could be an opportunity for the 
country to sell the institution GDP-linked bonds and for the institution to build the 
above mentioned loan portfolio. These financial assistance programs are 
accompanied by a reform package that, in principle, would increase potential growth. 
This suggested effort of an International Financial Institution does not preclude, 
however, the above-mentioned coordinated approach (in which these institutions 
could take a leading role). Financial institutions could also have a coordination role 
by, inter alia, guaranteeing that a sufficient volume of GDP-linked bonds is issued in 
order to reduce the liquidity premium (Cabrillac et al. 2017) and gathering a group of 
issuer countries that would allow to eliminate any potential reputational risk 
associated to countries with higher debt levels.   
  
5. Conclusions 
Researchers have been exploring GDP-linked bonds - their benefits, disadvantages 
and possible features - since the 1990s and even some sovereign equity-like 
instruments have already been issued. However, this type of issuance is still 
considered an exception and has not, by far, accomplished its full potential as an 
instrument that could play an important role in helping countries to avoid solvency 
crises. 
 
Theoretically, indexing a country’s debt payments to its economic performance could 
give governments a certain degree of insurance against periods of declining growth 
rates. As such, having as reference Borensztein and Mauro (Borensztein & Mauro 
2004), this work is an effort to illustrate the potential advantages of the issuance of 
GDP-linked bonds, in particular by illustrating and quantifying this insurance effect. 
By revisiting some of the exercises as laid out by these authors, some of the fiscal 
effects of this instrument become clear.  
 
In this context, interest bill savings for a group of some of the countries most 
affected by the European sovereign debt crisis - Portugal, Spain and Ireland - should 
they have issued GDP-linked bonds in the beginning of the decade, would have been 
significant. For Portugal, these savings would have amounted to 1.4%, 1% of GDP in 
the case of Spain and 0.6% of GDP for Ireland. Indeed, the amount of savings 
generated could have been particularly useful for countries such as Portugal, in light 
of the significant fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment pursued during this period, 
leaving room for, inter alia, countercyclical fiscal measures and so contributing to 
reduce, or even avoid, potential contractionary effects of fiscal consolidation.  
 
Moreover, reinforcing the potential of this instrument in giving room for a 
government to implement those countercyclical measures, the correlation between 
primary balance and real GDP growth, simulated for both situations - debt with 
indexation to GDP growth and without it - points to the same direction: correlation 
would be, in fact, significantly higher with indexation. One of the crucial benefits 
inherent to a stronger correlation between those variables is the increased fiscal space 
created, potentially having an automatic stabilising effect on fiscal policy. This fiscal 
stabilisation, in its turn, reduces the volatility of growth over the business cycle.  
 
Also, GDP-linked bonds could be instruments of particular interest for countries that 
belong to currency unions or for those subject to fiscal constraints. In this vein, 
correlation between primary balance and real GDP growth shows that indexing debt 
to GDP growth has the potential to offset, or even more than offset, the curbing 
effect of applying a constraint of 3% of GDP in the total deficit. 
 
A determinant factor of the issuance of such a new instrument is its pricing, in 
particular in this case the magnitude of the GDP risk premium. As such, simple 
regressions of individual countries’ GDP growth rates on the world GDP indicate 
that there would be a low portion of undiversified risk.  
 
However, when reading these results, it should be considered some caveats of the 
simulations and exercises conducted. As such, the calculation of the (implicit) 
coupon rate (as a ratio of interests paid and the debt stock) does not take into account 
that the actual debt stock also includes other instruments (such as currency and 
deposits and loans). Furthermore, along those exercises it is always made the strong 
assumption that changes in some fiscal variables (e.g. interest amount) would not 
affect economic growth and other fiscal aggregates. 
 
Notwithstanding the work already done in determining the potential pricing of a 
GDP-linked bond, there is still room to explore its quantification. Furthermore, 
research on possible practical ways to implement this product, involving a large 
group of stakeholders should be developed. In this context, the London Term sheet 
(developed by an ad hoc working group consisting of investment managers, lawyers 
from the private sector and economists from the Bank of England) is a good way to 
go forward. Finally, the potential intervention of the official sector, namely 
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